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866 STABTOP tI. PACIFIC ELECTRIC By. Co. [29 C.2d 
(L. A.. No. 19876. In Bank. Apr. 28, 1947.] 
SADIE STARTUP et aI., Appellants, v. PACIFIC 
ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY (a Corporation), 
Respondent. 
Pl Bailroad&-lDjuries from Operation-Warnings and Sipala.-
All interurban railroad company which bas undertaken to 
WarD travelers of its trains by the nse of a wigwag must use 
reasonable eare in the construction and maintenance of the 
signal system lest the appearance of 811.fety created by the. 
presence of the device constitute a trap for persons relying on 
it for protection. 
[2] 1d. -lDjuries from Operation - Instructions - Signals and 
Warnings.-In an action against an interurban railroad com-
pany for injuries sustained by automobile guests in a grade 
crossing collision. it was error to ,"ve an instruction that there 
wa!'! no evidence on which to mpport a ftndin~ that defendant 
was negligent in respect to the installation, operation or 
maintenance of the wigwag signals installed at the erossiug 
where, in view of plaintiffs' evidence of violation of defend-
ants' rule as to distance between trains, it could not be said as a 
matter of law that defendant was free from negligence in the 
operation or installation of a signaling system which depended 
on compliance with the rule to pn!Vent it from opeTatin2' as a 
trap. 
[8] 1d. -lDjuries from Operation-Oare b7 Bailroad-Warninp 
and Signals. - In an action against an interurban railroad 
company for injuries sustained by automobile ~ests in a 
grade, Grossing collision, it eould not be said as a matter of 
law that the eompany was uot negligent in the installation of 
a signaling system which depended on compliance with a rule 
as to distance between trains to prevent it from operating 
as a trap, where it appeared that the placement of cutin and 
eutout switches eould bave been adjusted so as to give WarD-
ing of the approach of all trains 
[4&,4b] Id.-lDJuries from Operation-Oontributol'7 Negligence.-
In an action against an interurban railroad company for in-
juries Bustained by automobile guests at night in a grade cross-
ing collision. it was error to instruet the jury that the driver 
[1] Bee 22 Oal.Jm. 307; 44 Am.Jm. 692. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Railroads, § 71(1); [2] Railroads, 
§ 122(5); [3] Railroads, 171(1); [4] Railroads, 1122(9); [6, 8] 
Railroads, 1109(1) • 
. < 
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of the automobile in which plaintiffs were riding was guilty 
of negligence 8S a matter of law where there was evidence 
that he took some precautions before crossing thl' tracks: 
that he had stopped 8t the crossin!! in responsE' to t~1' warn-
ing !riven by a wi~ag si~!I) Rnd waitei! while two trains passei! 
ani! until thE' wig-wR.e eeasl'i! operatin~: and that hI' ~tartei! 
across thE' track!" without again looking only when. in reliance 
on the cessation of thE' wigwag. it 8'PPl'arei! to him that he 
could do so with safety. 
[5) ld. - Injuries from Operation-Oontributory Negligence-Re-
llance on Safety Devices.-A railroad may not encouragE' per-
sons traveling on highways to rely on safety devices and tben 
bold them to the same de~e of care 8S if thE' devices wl're 
not present. 
[61 ld. - Injuries from Operation-Contributory Negligence-Re-
liance on Safety Devices. - An 8utomobile driver must take 
some precaution for his safety when attempting to mooss rail-
road tracks, even though the railroad has installed some !Y81em 
to warn of approaching trains. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Los Angele.c; County. Frank G. Swain. Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for injuries arising out of a collision of 
an automobile and a train. Judgment for defendant reversed. 
Samuel P. Young and Paul Blackwood for Appellants. 
Frank Karr, C. W. Cornell and O. O. Collins for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs were guests in an automobile 
which was struck by an interurban train operated by de-
fendant. They have appeaJed from a judgment rendered 
after a verdict in favor of defendant claiming that the 
jury was erroneously instructed on the law applicable to 
their theory of the case. 
The collision ocmIrred at approximately 12:45 a. m. at 
an intersection of defendant's private right-of-way with a 
six-lane highway on which there was heavy trafflc both day 
and night. There were four sets of tracks on the right-of-way; 
tracks one and two on the west carried southbound trains, 
and tracks three and four on the east were used for north-
bound trains. The automobile was proceeding east on the 
highway and after it erossed tracks one and two, it was 
struck by a three-car northbound train on track three . 
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The defendant maintained a warning system with wig-
wags at the southwest and northeast cornel'A of the intersec-
tion. The switcheR which operated the wigwags were placed 
nt varying distanceR from the hiJP:hway crossing and the PaR-
sage of a train on anyone of the foul' !'letA of trackR woulil 
!rta.rt and mop the warning device. On track three wherf' 
the accident occurred. the last cutin switch waR 576 feet !IIOuth 
of the center of the intel'Aection and the cutout switch wa!' 
39 feet north. with the reault that if one train W8fI followinl! 
another on track three within 600 feet. the wigwaJP: would' 
mop operating aR the ftnrt of the two trainR p8.!!Sed the 
cutout switch. and would not again function while the fol-
lowing train. havinJP: already paRRM the cmtin RWit.ch. ap-
proached the highway. 
The evidence iR sharply conflicting as to what occurred 
immediately prior to and at the time of the accident. Plain-
tiif!':' evidenee waR aR follows: The wigwap: WaR operatinJ! 
a..~ the automobile approached the intersection and the driver 
stopped at the c1'OR!!ing to let a !IIOuthbound freight train 
paSl'! on track one AR the freight train cleared the Cl'()8.<l-
in/! and while the automobile remaine<1 !rta.nding, a single 
internrban cal' passed on one of the three trackR farthest 
from the automobile The witnesReI'I did not agree aR to the 
track on whit'h the Ringle cal' waR tra.veling. The driver of 
the automobile te.~ified on direct examination that he be-
lieved the car WaR on track three. but that it could have 
been on track two. On cross-examination he testified that 
the ear WIUl traveling on track three or four. Plaintiff 
Startup placed the Ringle ear on track four. and one of the 
other plaintiffll testified that it WaR on track three 01' four 
The wigwag cea.~ed to operate when the single ear cleared 
the intersection. and the driver of the automobile, without 
again looking north or !'lOuth, started across the tracks. 
When the automobile reached track three, it was struck by 
a northbound three-ear train which followed the single ear. 
The train which collided with the automobile sounded no 
warning and the wigwag was not working as the train ap-
proached the intersection nor was it operating after the eol-
lision although the train had not passed the cutout switch. 
Defendant's evidence WIUl that the automobile did not 
stop, that neither a freight train nor a single car passed the 
crossing near the time of the accident. that the wigwag oper-
ated at all times and that the train which collided with the 
) 
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automobile sounded appropriate warning signals as it ap-
proached the intersection. 
It is clear that there was su1Bcient evidence to support 
a verdict for defendant, but plainti1fs eontend that the 
evidence presented material questions of fact with regard 
to the inRtallation, operation and maintenance of the sig-
nal system, and that the eourt el'1'Oneously took theRe 
qllestionll from the jury by the following instruction: 
"In this ease there is no evidence upon which to support 
a finding that the defendant was nt'.gligent in respect to 
the imrtallation, operation or maintenance of the wigwag 
aignalll installed at the crossing. You are therefore in-
structed that lUI to the iRSUe of whethel' defendant was neg-
ligent in respect to the wigwags, you muRt' find that the 
defendant WIUI not negligent. even though you may believe 
from the evidence that the wigwa~ Rt.opped opeTatin!! af'ter 
the freight train passed the crossinjr. ,. 
[1] The defendant. having undertaken to warn travelerK 
of the approach of' itA train.c; by the use of a wigwag, was 
under a duty to use reasonable care in the construction and 
maintenance of the signa) system lest the appearance of safety 
created by the presence of the device constitute a trap for 
persons relying upon it for protection. (W ... 1l v. Southern. 
PGCific Co., 18 Cal.2d 468. 473-474 rU6 P.2d 44]; Erie R. 
Co. v. Sf6'WtJrf,4O F.2d 855, 857; Mallett v. Southern. PtlCific 
Co., 20 Ca1.App.2d 500. 506 [68 P.2d 281).) 
[J] The uncontradicted evidence establishes that the sig-
naling system was 80 con.c;tructed that when one train fol-
lowed another on track three within 600 feet the wigwag 
would cease to operate when the first train cleared the cross-
ing, thereby indicating that traftic could cross the tracks in 
safety, notwithstanding the existence of imminent danger 
. from the following train. Plainti1fs' evidence was that these 
were the circumstances under which the system was operating 
. at the time of the accident. There was evidence that the wig-
wag was not working as the three-ear train approached the 
intersection on track three, and that the single car which 
passed the intersection shortly ahead of the three-ear train 
was also traveling on track three. It could be inferred that 
the wigwag stopped because the three-ear train was following 
the single car on the same track and within the distance in 
which the wigwag would not operate. The defendant, how-
ever, asserts that the operating rules of the company provide 
) 
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that one train shall not follow another at a distance of less 
than 2,500 feet, and that, if the train which struck the auto-
mobile was following so closely that the wigwag failed to give 
warning of its approach, this was the fault of the motorman 
and not of the signaling device. It is argued that the negli-
gence of the company, if any, resulted from the failure of its 
employees to abide by the rules of the company, and that the 
instruction was therefore correct in stating that the defend-
ant was not negligent in respect to the installation, main-
tenance or operation of the wigwag signals. This contention 
assumes that one of the purposes of the rule was to prevent 
the signaling device from operating as a trap. It follows 
from this assumption that compliance with the rule was an 
essential part of the operation of the system as a whole and, 
since it appears from plaintiffs' evidence that the rule was vio-
lated, it cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant was 
free from negligence in the operation of the signaling system. , 
[3] Nor can we say as a matter of law that the company 
was not negligent in the installation of a signaling system 
which depended upon compliance with such a rule to prevent 
it from operating as a trap. It appears that the placement 
of the cutin and cutout switches could have been adjusted 
so as to give warning of the approach of all trains, and 
this is a factor which the jury was entitled to consider 
in determining woother the company, having assumed the 
duty of warning travelers on the highway of the dangerous 
proximity of trains, used reasonable care in the installation 
and operation of its signaling system. 
[4&] Plaintiffs contend that the court also erred in 
giving the following instruction: 
"The driver of tile auto in which plaintiffs were riding 
testified that he starteli to cross defendants' tracks without 
looking for approaching trains, but relied wholly on the wig-
wag. You are instructed that the driver of the automobile 
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and if you :find 
that such negligence on his part was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident, then your verdict must be for defendant." 
As we have seen, the accident happened in the night time 
at an intersection which carried heavy traffic both day and 
night. The driver of the car stopped at the crossing in re-
sponse to the warning given by the wigwag and waited while 
two trains passed and until the wigwag ceased operating. He 
started across the tracks without again looking only when, 
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in reliance on the cessation of the wigwag, it appeared to 
him that he could do 80 in safety. 
[5] It is settled that a railroad may not encourage per-
sons traveling on highways to rely on safety devices and 
then hold them to the same degree of care as if the devices 
were not present. (Wm v. Southern Pacific Co., 18 Ca1.2d 
468, 474 [116 P.2d 44]; Toschi v. Christian, 24 Cal.2d 354, 
360 [149 2d 848]; Koch v. Southern California By. Co., 148 
Cal. 677, 680 [84 P. 176, 113 Am.St.Rep. 332. 7 Ann.Cas. 
795, 4 L.R.A.N.S. 521].) [6] The railroad tracks are, of 
course, themselves a warning of danger and a driver of an 
automobile must take some precautions for his safety when 
attempting to cross them, even though the railroad has in-
stalled 80me system to warn of approaching trains. (Will v. 
Southern Pacific Co., supra; Toschi v. Christian, supra, at 
p. 360, et seq.) It is ordinarily a question for the jury whether 
the precautions taken by the driver of ihe automobi1e are 
sufficient in view of a11 of the circumstances. (Toschi v. 
Christian, supra, at p. 360; Koch v. Southern California Ry. 
Co., supra, at p. 680; WI'll v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, at 
p. 475.) And it has been held that even where the crossing 
is unguarded and the driver failed to look that "In deter-
mining the degree of care which should be expected from a 
reasonably cautious person in crossing the railroad track . . . 
the jury might consider the fact that a freight train had just 
passed and that one would not ordinarily expect another train 
80 soon." (Pietrofitta v. Southern Pac. Co., 107 Cal.App. 
575. 580 [290 P. 597]. See, also, Lindsey v. Pacific Eke. By. 
Co., 111 Cal.App. 482, 488, et seq. [296 P. 131].) 
[4b] There was evidence that the driver of the automo-
bile in which plaintiffs were riding took some precautions 
before crossing the tracks, and "where it is shown that a 
[driver] has exercised some care, the question whether or not 
the care actually exercised was due and sufficient will always 
be a matter for determination by the jury." (Koch v. South-
ern California By. Co., 148 Cal. 677, 680 [84 P. 176, 113 Am. 
St.Rep. 332, 7 Ann.Cas. 795, 4 L.R.A.N.S. 521].) It was 
therefore error for the court to instruct the jury that the 
driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
J., eoneurred. 
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TRAYNOR, J .-1 concur in the judgment. 
1 agree with the main opinion regarding the instruction 
concerning the installation, operation, and maintenance of 
the wigwag signals. I cannot agree, however, as to the neg-
ligence of the driver of the automobile. The driver stopped 
at the crossing in response to the warning given by the wig-
wag and waited until two trains passed and the wigwag ceased 
operating. The crucial question is whether it was negligence 
thereafter to cross the tracks without looking for approach-
ing trains. A jury is in no better position than this court 
to answer this question. There is every reason why this issue, 
often raised in practice, should be settled by this court and 
not left to the oscillating verdicts of juries. (See Holmes, 
The Common Law, 123.) The court therefore should deter-
mine the standard of reasonable conduct for deciding whether 
or not the conduct in question was negligent. (See concurring 
opinion in Toschi v. Christian, 24 Cal.2d 354, 364 [149 P.2d 
848]; concurring opinion in Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School 
District, ante, pp. 581, 593 [177 P.2d 279].) In my opinion 
the invitation to cross implicit in the cessation of the wigwag 
and the absence of other factors that might serve to warn 
of danger relieved the driver of the duty to look for ap-
proaching trains. Be therefore complied with the require-
ments of due care when he stopped and waited for the ces-
sation of the wigwag before proceeding to cross the tracks. 
Such a driver is in a di1ferent position from a driver who finds 
the wigwag silent or in a stationary condition when he ap-
proaches the tracks and crosses them without lookblg for 
approaching trains. The former is assured by the operation 
of the wigwag that it is functioning and will warn of ap-
proaching trains, whereas the latter. having no such assur-
ance, must anticipate the possibility that the wigwag is not 
functioning. (See Will v. South8rn Pacific Co., 18 Cal.2d 
468, 474-475 L116 P.2d 44]; 53 A.L.R. 975; 99 A.L.R. 732.) 
Moreover, the instruction with respect to the driver's neg-
ligence was unnecessary and misleading. The plaintiffs were 
the guests of the driver and his negligence was not im-
putable to them. (Campagna v. Market St. By. Co., 24 Cal. 
2d 304, 309 [149 P.2d 281]; Pope v. HaZpern, 193 Cal. 168. I 
174 [223 P. 470 J; Bf'f/ant v. Pacific Eke. By. Co., 174 Cal. 
737 [164 P. 385]; see Restatement, Torts, § 490.) "The ulti-
mate question for the determination of the jury was whether 
defendants were guilty of negligence contributinB to plain-
. . 
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tUrs' injuries. The conduct of the driver of the automobile, 
not being in issue, was admissible in evidence only to the 
extent that it might aid in the determination of the ques. 
tion of the negligence of defendants." (Krupp v. Lo. Aft. 
geZu By. Corp., 57 Cal.App.2d 695, 698 [135 P.2d 424].) The 
vice of such an instruction is that it tends to lead the jury 
to believe that their verdict depends on the negligence of 
the driver. (See Krupp v. Lo, Aftgelu By. Corp., "'1'''(1; 
BeftOwdeft v. PGCift,c Electric By. Co., 73 Cal.App. 383, 387 
[238 P. 785]; Luftd v. PGCift,c Electric BJ/. Co., 25 Cal.2d 287, 
293-294 [153 P.2d 7051.) 
Respondent's petition for & rehea:riDs was deWecl Kq 
26, 1947 • 
